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1INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST
OF THE AMICI CURIAE STATEMENT1
Amici Curiae are law professors who research,
teach, and write on federal environmental and ad-
ministrative law. They are concerned in this case by
the majority’s conclusion below that issues related to
the interpretation of ambiguous statutory language
could be reached even though they were never raised
during the rulemaking process. This conclusion is
contrary to the clear language of the issue exhaustion
requirement articulated in Section 307(d)(7)(B) of the
Clean Air Act and contrary to proper role of reviewing
courts under Chevron. As a result, it could have far-
reaching impacts for a wide array of administrative
cases and agencies and should be corrected by the
Court. More information about the specific interest of
each professor is provided below.
Todd Aagaard is an Associate Professor at the
Villanova University School of Law. His teaching and
research focuses on environmental law and adminis-
trative law.
Lincoln L. Davies is a Professor of Law at the
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.
l In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amici
Curiae certify that no counsel for any party in this case au-
thored this brief in whole or in part, and furthermore, that no
person or entity, other than Amici Curiae, has made a monetary
contribution specifically for the preparation or submission of
this brief. The parties’ consent to the filing of this brief was filed
with the Clerk of this Court.
2Professor Davies’ research and teaching interests
center on energy and environmental law and policy,
administrative law, and water law.
John C. Dernbach is Distinguished Professor of
Law at Widener University in Harrisburg, Pennsyl-
vania and co-director of Widener’s Law Center. He
teaches courses in environmental law, international
environmental law, property, climate change, and
sustainable development. Professor Dernbach has
written on environmental law, sustainable develop-
ment and climate change in more than 40 articles for
law reviews and peer-reviewed journals. He is the
principal author or editor of three books on sustaina-
ble development in the United States. Before joining
Widener’s faculty, Professor Dernbach worked at the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, where he counseled and helped manage numer-
ous rulemakings.
Victor B. Flatt is the Tom & Elizabeth Taft
Distinguished Professor in Environmental Law, and
the Director of the Center for Law, Environment,
Adaptation, and Resources (CLEAR) at the Universi-
ty of North Carolina School of Law. He also has an
appointment as a Distinguished Scholar in Carbon
Markets and Carbon Trading at the Global Energy
Management Institute at the University of Houston’s
Bauer College of Business, and is a member scholar
of the Center for Progressive Reform. Professor Flatt
teaches courses in environmental law, natural re-
sources, interagency environmental cooperation,
international environmental law, climate change, and
3the practice of carbon trading. His scholarship focuses
on the administration and enforcement of environ-
mental and resource statutes, particularly the Clean
Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species
Act, and NEPA.
Eric T. Freyfogle is a Swanlund Chair at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is
the author or editor of a dozen books dealing with
issues of humans and nature, and is the co-author of
two casebooks, Property Law: Power, Governance, and
the Common Good (Thomson/West 2012) and Wildlife
Law: Cases and Materials (Foundation Press, 2002;
2d ed. 2010). Seven of his law review articles have
been reprinted, as among the best articles of the year,
in the annual volume Land Use & Environment Law
Review.
A~dy I-Iessick is a Professor of Law at the
University of Utah’s S.J. Quinney College of Law.
He teaches and writes in the areas of administrative
law, civil procedure, federal courts, and Supreme
Court practice.
Elizabeth Kronk Warner is an Associate
Professor of Law and Director of the Tribal Law and
Government Center at the University of Kansas
School of Law. Her research and teaching interests
include Federal Indian law, tribal law, environment
and natural resources, and property. In addition,
Professor Warner serves as an appellate judge for the
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians Court of
Appeals in Michigan.
4Justin Pidot is an Assistant Professor of Law at
the University of Denver Sturm College of Law,
where his scholarship and teaching focus on envi-
ronmental law, natural resources law, and federal
courts. Prior to joining the University of Denver
faculty, Professor Pidot was an appellate litigator at
the Environment and Natural Resources Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice.
Colette Routel is an Assistant Professor of Law
at the William Mitchell College of Law. Her teaching
and research interests include administrative law,
federal Indian law, and environmental and natural
resources law.
STATEMENT
The federal government typically issues between
600 to 800 notices of proposed rulemakings per year
that involve everything from catch limits for the
Hawaiian islands, http ://www.regulations.gov/# !
documentDetail;D=NOAA-NMFS-2013-0103-0001, to
proposals to prohibit window covering cords,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetedl;D=CPSC-
2013-0028-0001, to removing the gray wolf from the
endangered species list, http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=FWS-HQ-ES-2013-0073-0001. As
one commentator has noted, "[t]he volume and breadth
of social and economic policymaking undertaken by
the federal government on our behalf is breathtaking."
Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible
5Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the
Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 361
(2010). When a case implicates the basic rules gov-
erning proposed rulemakings, it has the potential to
have broad, often unanticipated consequences, and
therefore deserves the attention of this Court.
The present case involves one such rulemaking.
The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, also known as the
Transport Rule, implements the good neighbor provi-
sion that was extended to state planning by the 1990
revisions to the Clean Air Act. That provision pro-
vides that a State Implementation Plan (SIP):
contain adequate provisions ... prohibiting
¯.. any source or other type of emissions ac-
tivity within the State from emitting any air
pollutant in amounts which will ... contrib-
ute significantly to nonattainment in, or in-
terfere with maintenance by, any other State
with respect to any such national primary or
secondary ambient air quality standard ....
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2013). The Transport Rule
sets emissions reduction responsibilities for 27 up-
wind States based on their contributions to downwind
States’ air quality problems. The methodology for
defining "significant contribution" in this context is at
the heart of this case.
As is often the case, the Transport Rule rulemak-
ing was not the first go-around at the issue for the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In 1998, the
EPA promulgated the NOx SIP Call, which required
6NOx reductions for states contributing to ozone
nonattainment in downwind states. 63 Fed. Reg.
57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998). That rule was largely upheld
in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (2000). In 2005, the
agency issued the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR),
which was later vacated in 2008. See North Carolina
v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In response to
concerns expressed in North Carolina, the EPA
significantly revised the substance of CAIR, resulting
in the new Transport Rule. In the case below, EME
Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir.
2012), the D.C. Circuit vacated the Transport Rule
after concluding that the EPA had improperly deter-
mined which states would "contribute significantly"
to downwind air pollution problems.
None of the briefs supporting the many petitions
for review below, nor the majority opinion for the D.C.
Circuit reviewing the Transport Rule, cite to anything
in the rulemaking docket that challenges the EPA’s
statutory interpretation of "significant contribution."
Instead, the majority relied on the CAIR proceedings
several years ago to suggest the EPA knew that
parties objected to its statutory interpretation in the
revamped Transport Rule.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 307(d)(7)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B), requires that "[o]nly an objec-
tion to a rule or procedure which was raised with
7reasonable specificity during the period for public
comment.., may be raised during judicial review." In
this case, no such objection was made with respect to
the EPA’s significant contribution analysis, an ap-
proach that was detailed over many pages in the
proposed rulemaking. By deciding an issue that was
not raised during the rulemaking process, the court of
appeals exceeded its jurisdiction. This conclusion is
dictated not only by the CAA statute, but is also
required as a matter of appropriate judicial review
and as a matter of basic fairness to the parties.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE EXHAUSTION SAFEGUARDS JU-
DICIAL ECONOMY AND ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AUTONOMY.
This Court has long held that "[s]imple fairness
to those who are engaged in the tasks of administra-
tion, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that
courts should not topple over administrative decisions
unless the administrative body not only has erred but
has erred against objection made at the time appro-
priate under its practice." United States v. L.A. Tuck-
er Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952). More
recently, in Sims v. Apfel, the Court again reiterated
that a petitioner may not object in court to an admin-
istrative action when a statute requires that objec-
tions first be presented to the agency. 530 U.S. 103,
107-08 (2000) (holding that a Social Security claimant
need not raise issues during internal agency appeals
8because, among other things, no rule or statute
required it but also noting that "[a]lthough the ques-
tion is not before us, we think it likely that the Com-
missioner could adopt a regulation that did require
issue exhaustion.").
The underlying purposes of administrative
exhaustion doctrines are well understood. Exhaustion
serves the "twin purposes of protecting administra-
tive agency authority and promoting judicial efficien-
cy." McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992);
see also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95
(1969) (recognizing that consistent enforcement of
exhaustion requirements is supported by both respect
for agency autonomy and by concern for judicial
efficiency); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765
(1975) ("Exhaustion is generally required as a matter
of preventing premature interference with agency
processes, so that the agency may function efficiently
and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its
own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the
benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile
a record which is adequate for judicial review.").
Allowing agencies the first opportunity to re-
spond to challenges supports judicial economy in at
least two ways. First, agencies can resolve challenges
and eliminate the need for judicial review. In McKart
v. United States, this Court observed that the "com-
plaining party may be successful in vindicating his
rights in the administrative process. If he is required
to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts
may never have to intervene." 395 U.S. at 195; see
9also McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145 (exhaustion promotes
judicial efficiency because "[w]hen an agency has the
opportunity to correct its own errors, a judicial con-
troversy may well be mooted.").
Even if the need for judicial review is not elimi-
nated, allowing the agency an opportunity to respond
to challenges generates a more complete factual
record. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 194 ("[I]t is normally
desirable to let the agency develop the necessary
factual background upon which decisions should be
based."). A fully developed factual record is particu-
larly important where disputes involve complex
issues within the special competence of the expert
agencies. In that way, "[p]ractical considerations
arising out of the agency’s familiarity with the subject
matter as well as institutional considerations caution
strongly against courts’ deciding ordinary, circum-
stance-specific matters that the parties have not
raised before the agency." Sims, 530 U.S. at 116
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
Providing agencies the first opportunity to re-
spond to rulemaking challenges also respects admin-
istrative autonomy, and is especially important where
Congress has expressly provided an exhaustion
requirement by statute. Indeed, this Court has
acknowledged that the "requirements of administra-
tive issue exhaustion are largely creatures of statute,"
Sims, 530 U.S. at 107, and that congressional intent
is of "paramount importance to any exhaustion in-
quiry," McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Most importantly, "where Congress
10
specifically mandates, exhaustion is required." Id. Cf.
Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S.
645, 665 (1982) (holding that the Court of Appeals
lacked jurisdiction to review objections not raised
before the agency because a statute provided that
"[n]o objection that has not been urged before the
Board... shall be considered by the court."); Federal
Power Comm’n v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348
U.S. 492, 497-98 (1955) ("[T]he court is ... expressly
precluded from considering an objection when, with-
out prior application to the Commission, that objec-
tion is presented to the court by the party directly
aggrieved.").
In those cases, like this one, in which a specific
exhaustion requirement exists, the next question is
whether Congress intended the exhaustion requirement
to apply to a particular situation. That question is
easily answered here because the statutory exhaus-
tion requirement expressly applies to rulemakings
like the one at issue here. In particular, the Clean Air
Act provides that "[o]nly an objection to a rule or
procedure which was raised with reasonable specifici-
ty during the period for public comment ... may
be raised during judicial review." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(d)(7)(B). The fact that the CAA expressly
requires issue exhaustion in rulemakings like this
one separates this case from those like Sims that
have no such broad requirement. Indeed, complex
problems like interstate air pollution transport are
precisely the sort that Congress sought to give the
EPA first crack at resolving. Invoking exhaustion to
11
give the EPA an opportunity to manage these complex
problems in the first instance is also in line with this
Court’s observations.
The starting point of this analysis, therefore, is
clear. If the challengers to the Transport Rule decided
not to raise certain issues during the notice and
comment rulemaking procedure, the D.C. Circuit
should not have reviewed those issues. To do other-
wise thwarts the express intent of Congress and the
general principles underlying the issue exhaustion
requirement. Cf. Unemployment Compensation Comm’n
v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946) ("A reviewing
court usurps the agency’s function when it sets aside
the administrative determination upon a ground not
theretofore presented and deprives the [agency] of an
opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling,
and state the reasons for its action.").
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT’S ISSUE EXHAUS-
TION REQUIREMENT REQUIRES THAT
AN AGENCY HAVE ADEQUATE NOTICE.
To say that the issue exhaustion requirement
applies to judicial review of Clean Air Act petitions
does not fully answer the question. The Clean Air
Act provides that litigants raise issues before the
agency with "reasonable specificity." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(d)(7)(B). On its own, this phrase sets no par-
ticular standard but rather relies on a test of reason-
ableness. Logically, then, whether a litigant raised an
issue with adequate specificity would turn on the
12
underlying purposes of the exhaustion requirement
as well as the specific context in which the issue
arises. Here, the question is whether an issue is
raised with sufficient specificity to put the EPA on
notice of the challenges lodged against its proposed
rulemaking. Notice, after all, is the ultimate touch-
stone of whether an agency had a meaningful oppor-
tunity to address and resolve the later-raised
challenge. See, e.g., Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA,
89 F.3d 858, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (declining to review
challenges when the petitioner "has not demonstrated
that it ever brought this specific complaint to the
attention of the agency during an appropriate com-
ment period"); Natural Resources Def. Council v.
Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding
that "[a]lthough we think it worthy of the EPA’s
attention, we ultimately do not decide this difficult
issue of statutory interpretation, for it appears no
party raised it during the rulemaking’s comment
period, as required by the Act.").
Here, the Court would give due respect to the
Clean Air Act’s statutory language, serve the core
functions of the exhaustion doctrine, and recognize
broader considerations of justice if it judged "reason-
able specificity" by considering whether the EPA was
properly notified of the statutory challenge that
industry petitioners raised for the first time on judi-
cial review. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit’s own interpreta-
tion of the Clean Air Act’s issue exhaustion
requirement in prior cases bars judicial review when
adequate notice has not been provided. See, e.g.,
13
Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232,
1238 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Reasonable specificity requires
something more than a general challenge to EPA’s
approach." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In
particular, drawing on waiver in the litigation con-
text, the D.C. Circuit has announced that "although
we allow commenters ’some leeway in developing
their argument before this court,’ the comment must
have provided ’adequate notification of the general
substance of the complaint.’" Natural Resources Def.
Council v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(quoting South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. EPA,
472 F.3d 882, 891 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). The D.C. Circuit
has thus struck the balance between providing notice
and the specificity required for that notice.
Important to considerations of fairness, the
reasonable specificity requirement articulated by the
CAA is consistent with notice requirements for all
participants in the rulemaking process. The D.C.
Circuit itself has long held that agencies must pro-
vide adequate notice to parties of its actions and
decisions. For example, the D.C. Circuit has em-
braced the logical outgrowth test to determine
whether an agency has provided adequate notice of a
final rule. See City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706,
715 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("’Under the "logical outgrowth"
test ... , the key question is whether commenters
"should have anticipated" that EPA might’ issue the
final rule it did." (citations omitted)). The same court
also recently discounted an addition made by the EPA
14
too late in a Clean Air Act rulemaking proceeding to
be meaningful:
A purpose of notice-and-comment provisions
under the APA (and presumably of the more
elaborate procedural safeguards in § 307 of
the Clean Air Act) is "to ensure that affected
parties have an opportunity to participate in
and influence agency decision making at an
early stage, when the agency is likely to give
real consideration to alternative ideas." New
Jersey, Department of Environmental Protec-
tion v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1049 (D.C. Cir.
1980). By waiting until the petition for re-
consideration to respond to a comment that
had been raised during the comment period,
EPA deprives the affected party of the oppor-
tunity to respond to EPA’s rationale and in-
fluence agency action at an earlier stage.
Thus, just as we will not entertain an argu-
ment raised for the first time in a reply brief
to prevent sandbagging of appellees and re-
spondents, we are reluctant to affirm based
on a factual assertion raised for the first
time in an agency’s denial of a petition for
reconsideration when the agency had an op-
portunity to raise that point at an earlier
point in the rulemaking process. See
Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 608 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
National Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 2013
WL 4417438, "31 (August 20, 2013). These require-
ments illustrate that the principles of simple fairness
have informed the administrative processes on all
15
sides, and reasonable notice is one of its basic re-
quirements.
The problem in this particular case is that the
D.C. Circuit failed to follow the requirements of the
statute. It also did not adhere to its own standards.
As a result, the court thwarted congressional intent
and created the very problems that exhaustion doc-
trines were meant to avoid.
III. APPLYING THE ISSUE EXHAUSTION
REQUIREMENT AS MANDATED BY THE
CAA IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH COM-
MON LAW.
The CAA’s approach to the issue exhaustion
requirement is consistent with the broader common
law application of exhaustion doctrines by this Court
and others. To that end, more than forty years ago
this Court recognized the case-specific nature of the
exhaustion inquiry and the importance of considering
the underlying purpose of the doctrine:
The doctrine is applied in a number of differ-
ent situations and is, like most judicial doc-
trines, subject to numerous exceptions.
Application of the doctrine to specific cases
requires an understanding of its purposes
and of the partic~ar administrative scheme
involved.
McKart, 395 U.S. at 193.
In McCarthy, this Court recognized several
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine for cases where
16
there was no specific congressional mandate. See 503
U.S. at 146-50. Those exceptions include situations in
which requiring parties to engage the administrative
process before seeking judicial review would result in
undue prejudice (e.g., where there would be unrea-
sonable delay or plaintiff would suffer irreparable
harm without immediate judicial review); where
there is some doubt as to the agency’s institutional
competence to resolve the issue raised (e.g., there is a
challenge to the constitutionality of the underlying
statute or the agency’s own procedures); or where the
agency is shown to be biased or otherwise predeter-
mined the issues before it. See id.
While the common law exceptions demonstrate a
certain case-specific and flexible approach to the
exhaustion requirement, none of those exceptions
apply here, where Congress has required issue ex-
haustion as a condition of judicial review under the
Clean Air Act. Cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 152 (evalu-
ating the individual and institutional interests at
stake in the case "[b]ecause Congress has not re-
quired exhaustion of a federal prisoner’s Bivens
claim."). Even if they did apply, as a matter of sub-
stance, none of the exceptions fit this case.
It might be suggested that, because the court
below viewed the agency as exceeding its statutory
authority, the CAA’s provision requiring any issue in
a rulemaking to be raised with "reasonable specifici-
ty" may not apply. First, the language of § 7607(d)(7)
admits of no such exception and the D.C. Circuit has
never before interpreted it to make such an exception.
17
See Natural Resources Def. Council v. Thomas, 805
F.2d 410, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying exhaustion
requirement to statutory interpretation issues).
Moreover, creating such an exception for this case
misunderstands the nature of the statutory question
at hand. This is not the rare case in which the agency
has profoundly erred with respect to the statutory
scheme it administers and no commenter raised the
issue. Instead, the majority opinion’s objections to the
EPA’s actions turn on questions of the reasonable
interpretation of the statute. In such circumstances,
the court is not authorized to substitute "the reading
the court would have reached if the question initially
had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Chevron USA,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843 n.ll (1983). Instead, the court only engages in
limited review of the agency’s action: "the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
Accordingly, it makes little sense to review an inter-
pretation that has never been presented to the agency
for its consideration and full explanation. This kind of
statutory interpretation question - one that is left
unanswered by Congress and one whose reasonable-
ness turns on facts within the special competency of
the agency - is precisely the kind that would benefit
from the principles underlying the exhaustion doc-
trine. In particular, judging the reasonableness of an
agency’s interpretation in this case would have been
aided by giving the agency an opportunity to explain
how its interpretation best reconciles the language of
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the statute with the practical difficulties of resolving
interstate air transport problems.
IV. THE RESPONDENTS’ STATUTORY CHAL-
LENGE TO THE TRANSPORT RULE IS
BARRED BY THE ISSUE EXHAUSTION
REQUIREMENT.
Though some flexibility is inherent in the Clean
Air Act’s exhaustion requirement, and in the exhaus-
tion doctrines as applied at common law, the doctrine
must pay more than mere lip service to judicial
economy, administrative autonomy, and congressional
intent. Here, this case is not a close one and the D.C.
Circuit’s application is tantamount to rejecting the
Clean Air Act’s issue exhaustion requirement entirely.
Cf. EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7,
52 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting) ("The
jurisdictional question is not close; the court’s efforts
to avoid this court’s well-settled precedent fails
clearly.").
There are three particularly troubling aspects of
the D.C. Circuit’s application of the issue exhaustion
doctrine in this case. First, the court concluded that
the exhaustion requirement was met not because the
litigants had raised their objections to the agency, but
because the court had commented on the bounds of
statutory authority in its previous review of earlier
rulemakings. In other words, the court’s own concerns
about statutory authority were used to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement, not objections made by
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interested parties to the rulemaking at hand. Second,
to satisfy the exhaustion requirement for the
Transport Rule, the court allowed litigants to rely on
objections made during previous rulemakings, at
points earlier in the regulatory history of the agency’s
attempts to resolve interstate air pollution problems.
But it is precisely the long regulatory history and the
industry challengers’ previous objections on similar
issues that suggest their silence in response to the
Transport Rule would reasonably have been inter-
preted by the EPA as a concession of authority. Final-
ly, the court’s review of the issue would have
benefitted from the agency’s analysis in the first
instance.
A. The Issue Exhaustion Requirement Is
Not Met By Relying on Language in
Court Decisions Reviewing Previous
Versions of the Challenged Rule.
In arguing that the issue exhaustion requirement
was met, the majority opinion relies on its previous
decision in North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), where the court reviewed and vacated the
2005 CAIR, the predecessor to the Transport Rule.
In North Carolina, the D.C. Circuit suggested
that the EPA would exceed the statutory authority of
the good neighbor provision if it required upwind
states to reduce their emissions beyond the portion
that significantly contributes to downwind nonat-
tainment. Based on the admonishments in North
2O
Carolina, the majority concluded that the EPA should
have had notice that its later-crafted Transport Rule
exceeded the statutory authority of the good neighbor
provision.
If the North Carolina decision was as clear as the
majority argues, it stands to reason that some com-
menters would have raised an objection to the EP~s
statutory authority in response to the proposed
Transport Rule. The fact that no commenter read the
North Carolina decision to obviously reject the ap-
proach that the EPA later embraced in the Transport
Rule demonstrates one of two things. First, that the
opinion could not fairly be said to put the EPA on
notice that an approach like that taken in the
Transport Rule would violate the statute. Or, second,
none of the very interested and motivated challengers
believed that the EPA exceeded its authority despite
the admonishment of the court in North Carolina.
Either way, the North Carolina decision cannot be
bootstrapped to put the EPA on notice that the
Transport Rule exceeds the bounds of the good neigh-
bor provision.
As Judge Rogers explained in dissent, another
problem with the majority’s argument is that the
statutory challenge raised for the first time on judi-
cial review of the Transport Rule was not even one of
the issues litigated in North Carolina. See EME
Homer City v. EPA, 696 F.3d at 39-40 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting). In other words, while some commenters
objected to the 2005 CAIR on the theory that it ex-
ceeded statutory authority of the good neighbor
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provision, no commenters pursued that objection
during judicial review of the 2005 CAIR. Then, after
the North Carolina decision, no commenters raised
the statutory authority argument in response to the
proposed Transport Rule. As a result, the EPA has
no obligation to respond to an objection that was
unlitigated in response to CAIR and not raised in
response to the Transport Rule.
This highlights an even more fundamental
question, which is whether general and prospective
admonishments made by a court in its response to
one agency rule can even be treated as comments to a
subsequently proposed agency rulemaking. This
would mean that a litigant would satisfy the Clean
Air Act’s issue exhaustion requirement by assembling
the relevant jurisprudence and arguing that the
agency should have understood the precise bounds of
its statutory authority; no further action would be
necessary during rulemaking to notify the agency
that it exceeded its authority in a particular proposed
rule. Such an end-around the exhaustion requirement
cuts against both the plain language of Section
307(d)(7)(B) and the goal of increasing transparency
between the agency and commenters so that issues
can be resolved or further developed during the
administrative process.
In creating this end-around, the majority funda-
mentally conflated a statutory issue raised by the
court in response to CAIR with issues raised by the
industry challengers in their comments to the
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Transport Rule now under challenge.
should not make a similar mistake.
This Court
B. Comments Made in a Previous Rule-
making Cannot Be Automatically
Bootstrapped and Assumed to Apply to
the Challenged Rule.
Just as the court below assumed that the exhaus-
tion requirement could be met by bootstrapping
issues raised by the court in its review of CAIR, the
court similarly assumes that objections raised by
commenters to the 2005 CAIR can be automatically
renewed with respect to the 2011 Transport Rule.
See EME Homer City, 696 F.3d at 39-40 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the comments offered by
the majority to support its review were comments
made during the administrative proceedings of CAIR,
which were not incorporated into the Transport Rule’s
administrative proceeding). By this logic, in cases
where there is a long regulatory history and several
iterations of a rule have been previously litigated,
vacated, and revisited, the agency would have to
assume that all previous objections remain live in the
later revised rules. All objections made at any point
in the regulatory history would automatically be
carried forward without further action by the liti-
gants.
This simply cannot be. Administrative rulemak-
ing would be severely hampered and slowed, more so
than it already is, if an agency were burdened with
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reading the tea leaves of an entire regulatory history
and compelled to assume that previous objections
were automatically renewed. A better approach, and
the one that clearly fits with the statutory language,
is to require challengers to raise with reasonable
specificity their objections to each rule. Of course, this
could be done quite simply by cross-referencing
previous objections. It must, however, be done. Basic
communication dictates this be so.
Common sense also dictates that if an objection
raised early on in a rule’s regulatory history is not
expressly renewed in subsequent stages, the com-
menter has decided the objection is not viable or
otherwise not strategically worth pursuing. Here, the
decision not to raise a statutory challenge in response
to the Transport Rule is particularly troubling. Recall
that the litigants had raised the issue in comments to
CAIR and did not raise it here. The litigants’ silence
in this case, therefore, bears special meaning and
suggests the issue of statutory authority had been
resolved.
Embracing an approach under which an objection
is presumed dead unless expressly renewed allows
judicial review to work most efficiently with adminis-
trative rulemaking. At each stage in the review and
with each new version of a rule, the agency can be
assured that it has sufficiently satisfied the concerns
of the courts and commenters if earlier raised objec-
tions are not subsequently renewed. This system,
moreover, places no special burden on the comment-
ers. It merely requires them to become familiar with
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the regulatory history of a rulemaking and raise
previous objections again if those objections remain
valid. In the end, the basic rule of issue exhaustion
articulated by the statute allows the rulemaking
process in the more complex cases like this one to
move forward, culling the issues and bringing in-
creased clarity with each rulemaking attempt.
Co Interstate Air Transport Raises the
Kind of Complex Problems That Would
Benefit From Agency Review in the
First Instance.
The reason for requiring exhaustion is particular-
ly clear where, as here, complex problems within the
special competency of the agency would have benefitted
from the agency’s response to the late-raised issues.
See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145 ("Exhaustion concerns
apply with particular force when the action under
review involves exercise of the agency’s discretionary
power or when the agency proceedings in question
allow the agency to apply its special expertise."). The
sheer size of this particular rulemaking - which
includes tens of thousands of comments and a 3000-
page Primary Response to Comments (see EPA,
Transport Rule Primary Response to Comments
(June 2011), Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0491-
4513, available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQOAR-2009-0491-4513) -
illustrates just how complex and difficult this rule-
making was. It is also no secret that interstate air
pollution transport raises complex technical and
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policy questions wrapped up in issues of public
health, cost, and feasibility. See Petr. EPA Br. at 46-
55.
Consider for instance the not-so-simple problem
of determining which states are upwind states con-
tributing to downwind nonattainment and which
states are downwind states that are unwitting recipi-
ents of upwind pollution. In a modeling map produced
by the EPA to explain its proposed Transport Rule,
Texas is an upwind contributor of ozone to Louisiana.
See EPA, Proposed Air Pollution Transport Rule,
Slideshow Presentation, at slide 35, available at
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/transport/pdfs/TRPrese
ntationfinal_7-26_webversion.pdf. At the same time
Texas is a downwind recipient of ozone from Oklaho-
ma, Kansas, Arkansas, Illinois, Florida, and some
states as far away as the Northeast. Id. Louisiana, in
turn, is also downwind from the ozone emitted by
Arkansas, Mississippi, and Georgia. Id. So which
states are responsible for nonattainment in Louisi-
ana? How much, for instance, should Texas be held
responsible when it is also an unwitting downwind
recipient of ozone? And this is just the complexity of
figuring out who is doing what damage, never mind
the public health and science determinations of what
portion of emissions constitute excess or significant
contributions.
Congress recognized the importance of address-
ing interstate air pollution when it included the good
neighbor provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2013).
But it also recognized the complex task of regulating
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intermingled air pollution when it amended the good
neighbor provision in 1990 to expand EPA’s authority.
Namely, the 1990 amendments permit regulation of
upwind states that "significantly contribute" to
downwind nonattainment, rather than requiring a
stronger causal link wherein the upwind states
"prevent" downwind nonattainment. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1988) (requiring regulation of
upwind states that would "prevent attainment" in a
downwind State) with 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(D)
(2013) (requiring SIPs to regulate emissions that
"contribute significantly" to nonattainment in down-
wind States). In this way, Congress expanded the
EPA’s regulatory authority to regulate upwind states
that contribute to downwind nonattainment in com-
bination with other states. See EME Homer City, 696
F.3d at 21 n.14 (explaining the statutory history of
the good neighbor provision and noting the expanded
authority). The point is simply that Congress already
amended the good neighbor provision once in recogni-
tion that the issues are more complicated than super-
ficial consideration would dictate.
In cases such as these, courts are less equipped
to pass on the particular statutory bounds or to draw
precise "red lines" when the record remains undevel-
oped on whether the court’s contours are compatible
with the technical and political realities that compli-
cate the statutory mandate. Accordingly, this was a
particularly bad context for the court to ignore the
statutory exhaustion requirement.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals
reversed.
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